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ABSTRACT 
It has long been debated as to the proper role of the United States Supreme 
Court in the American political and legal process. This paper focuses on continuing that 
debate by arguing that the role of the Supreme Court should be limited in the specific 
realms of election law and campaign finance. By reviewing contemporary Supreme 
Court cases and scholarly works, I analyzed the Court’s actions, and found the Court 
using legal principles to interfere with the legislative power of creating public policy in 
the fields of election law and campaign finance. Since Congress is granted certain 
powers to act, it is for Congress to create policy in these areas, not the Court. That is 
why the Court’s role should be limited in these fields to actions that are beyond a 
reasonable doubt as promoted by James Bradley Thayer. By taking this limited 
approach, the modern Court under the cases of Bush v. Gore; Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission; Shelby County v. Holder; and McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission, has violated its powers of judicial review by overstepping into public policy 
determinations.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's only armor is the cloak of public trust; its sole 
ammunition, the collective hopes of our society. 
-  Irving R. Kaufman 
(ThinkExist.com 1999) 
 
 
The role of the Supreme Court in the American political and legal system has 
been an area of debate since the founding of the United States government. The Court 
has come to be seen as a body of social and political change, but also as a body of 
partisan politics that does not have to fear the dismissal of elections. These competing 
views over the Court have led to a long dispute as to the proper role of the Court. The 
function of this paper is to continue this debate in the more narrow arenas of election 
law and campaign finance by answering the question of whether the Court has returned 
to a more Lochner-era type jurisprudence in these specific areas. More specifically, are 
the Court’s more recent decisions over election law and campaign finance a repetition 
of the policy mistakes made in Lochner v. New York? 
Modern cases have come to show that the Court, in handing down its decisions, 
has come back towards a jurisprudence that dominated the now repudiated Lochner-era 
of the Court. More specifically, the Court has done so in the public policy arenas of 
election law and campaign finance. These contemporary cases show the Court using 
Constitutional provisions within these given arenas to appropriate powers for itself by 
taking such powers away from the legislature and executive. 
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In making such an argument, this paper will begin by discussing and summarizing 
the theoretical debate that surrounds the political and legal role of the Court made by a 
variety of political theorists, including John Hart Ely, Ronald Dworkin, and Cass R. 
Sunstein. However, this paper will defend the interpretation argued for by James 
Bradley Thayer: that the Court should have a very limited role in the political process. 
After reviewing and discussing the arguments and counter-arguments made by 
each of the above mentioned theorists and the role they see fit for the Court, this paper 
will defend the side of Thayer and discuss why each of the previous theorists’ ideals are 
insufficient. After this discussion, this paper will summarize how the Court itself, since 
its inception, has never fully decided on its own proper role within the American 
political system. This section will be a walk-through of how the Court has established 
itself as the final arbiter of constitutional legal questions, but has both extended and 
retracted the power it has in making such determinations. 
Lastly, this paper will take contemporary cases determined by the modern Court 
in election law and campaign finance and explain why each marks the idea that the 
Court has returned to an era of granting itself more expansive powers over the 
legislature and executive within each realm. The modern cases under review include 
Bush v. Gore; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission; Shelby County v. Holder; 
and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. After discussing how the Court has 
extended its powers, it will be shown how each of these cases fails to meet the 
standards created under the theory advocated by Thayer. 
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In the end, the role of the Supreme Court and the judiciary is one that will never 
be fully understood or established. However, this paper is meant to be seen as an 
argument of why the role of the Court should be one of limited powers and interference 
into the political process; specifically in the areas of election law and campaign finance. 
Without a limited role for the Court, the political process can be turned on its head, and 
policy issues left to the body of 9 unelected officials, instead of the legislature or 
executive. 
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CHAPTER II: COMPETITION OVER INTERPRETATION 
The constitution of the United States is to receive a reasonable 
interpretation of its language, and its powers, keeping in view the objects 
and purposes, for which those powers were conferred. By a reasonable 
interpretation, we mean, that in case the words are susceptible of two 
different senses, the one strict, the other more enlarged, that should be 
adopted, which is most consonant with the apparent objects and intent 
of the Constitution.  
- Joseph Story 
(Story 1833) 
 
 
These words by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story purport that when there is 
competition about how the United States Constitution should be interpreted; the view 
that follows the will of the document itself should prevail. However, this seems to be 
easier said than done. Since the Constitution’s inception in 1789, the method of its 
interpretation has been in constant competition. Furthermore, the debate as to the 
proper interpretation has not subsided by any means over the course of the 
Constitution’s history. However, the one position I find legitimate and rooted in 
American history is that made by James Bradley Thayer. 
James Bradley Thayer determined that the idea of judicial review is well rooted 
in American legal history dating back to the Revolution. (Thayer 1893, 7). The concept of 
holding political actions by either the legislature or executive as against the constitution 
had come into existence by assertions made by English judges and writers and further 
favored among the American founders. (Ibid.). Even though the idea was never given in 
any exact language in any legal document, the concept had always remained 
“inferential” in the legal processes. (Ibid., 3). 
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It may be remarked here that the doctrine of declaring legislative Acts 
void as being contrary to the constitution, was probably helped into 
existence by a theory which found some favor among our ancestors at 
the time of the Revolution, that courts might disregard such acts if they 
were contrary to the fundamental maxims of morality, or, as it was 
phrased, to the laws of nature. (Ibid., 7). 
 
However, Thayer articulates that even though this power has its historical roots, 
it has also been historically limited. (Ibid., 8). When the governments of the nation and 
the states began to form towards the end of the Revolution, most Constitutions, such as 
the Massachusetts Constitution, established a limited power of the Court in that the 
Court “‘Shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers or either of them.’” 
(Ibid., 8). The trend towards a limited role of the Court was seen that “[i]n the case of 
purely political acts and of the exercise of mere discretion, it mattered not that other 
departments were violating the constitution, the judiciary could not interfere.” (Ibid., 8-
9). This implied power of the Courts needs to be instead restricted to issues that are 
very clear. (Ibid., 25). 
The constant declaration of the judges that the question for them is not 
one of the mere and simple preponderance of reasons for or against, but 
of what is very plain and clear, clear beyond a reasonable doubt, – this 
declaration is really a steady announcement that their decisions in 
support of the constitutionality of legislation do not, as of course, import 
their own opinion of the true construction of the constitution, and that 
the strict meaning of their words, when they hold an Act constitutional, is 
merely this, – not unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.). 
 
I believe Thayer’s overall position seems to possibly have two different 
underlying interpretations as to why beyond a reasonable doubt should apply towards 
the Court. The first interpretation is that Thayer adopted the beyond a reasonable 
doubt rule because the Founders had clearly intended that such a rule apply upon the 
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Court in a more Originalist approach. That this standard presented by Thayer, was 
specifically meant to apply towards the Court when making Constitutional 
determinations. Such an interpretation would hold a strong position upon Court power 
with the logic being that if the Founders specifically intended the Court to follow such a 
limited standard from the time of its inception, then the Court must continue to 
maintain such a role and hold steady in the position to which it was intended and not 
overreach. Thayer’s approach could be seen as including this interpretation with how he 
specifically refers back to documents deriving from the time of the founding of our 
national government and their individual wording. The second interpretation is that 
history has shown a large concern and fear over the government becoming 
undemocratic in nature when an over-reaching Court could interfere into the 
deliberative process and make political and discretionary policy determinations. This 
theory still maintains a historical precedent as does the former interpretation, but is 
based more on maintaining a democratic form of government with less interference by 
an unelected body. It is this latter interpretation that I believe holds the most strength. 
The Originalist interpretation holds a strong position, but does not give the flexibility of 
expanding the Constitution towards the time and manner of a changing world. 
However, the interpretation that revolves around the fear of undemocratic government 
can change based on the times. If the government and people see it necessary to 
expand or retract the specific roles of each of the branches of government, such as the 
Court taking a more political role, then such an interpretation can be expanded or 
retracted, as will be shown later with my own expansion of Thayer’s approach, as 
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necessary without specifically changing or amending the Constitution itself to 
circumvent the Founders’ intentions. However, if the Constitution were in need of 
change, the government would always be limited in a manner as was specifically given 
by the Founders, who had no regard as to how the times would change. Furthermore, it 
seems Thayer’s argument was far more concerned with the latter interpretation based 
on the precedent he used; that this fear should remain and justify a more restrictive role 
for the Court in being able to reach into the political decisions made by the other 
branches of government. Thayer never mentions that the Founders specifically stated 
the Court could only interfere when there is a violation beyond a reasonable doubt. 
However, Thayer was able to use historical precedent to show that there seems to be a 
historical fear or democratic justification for limiting the Court to his standard of beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  
The interpretation of an underlying fear of an over-reaching Court appears from 
the idea that Thayer reasoned that this determination, that the Court should only 
review issues that exist beyond any reasonable doubt, falls into agreement with the 
oath judges take, and that their constitutional description does not in itself say that 
when an executive or legislature takes an action it is constitutionally permitted to take 
can be simply overruled by the Court. (Ibid., 4). If the Court was meant to be included in 
the political, policy making process, such a power would have been expressly included 
instead of being given as such an “incidental and postponed control.” (Ibid., 10).  
Thayer’s main concern in describing the limited impact of the Court was to keep 
the body outside of the realm of politics and the idea of discretionary, policy making 
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decisions. The power of judicial review seems to remain strictly judicial and may not 
decide cases based on policy. (Ibid., 8-9). The Court should maintain this strict, limited 
role in order to remain seemingly unpolitical and not interfere or restrict the powers of 
the other branches of government. (Ibid., 25). Judicial review is only meant to interfere 
when the other branches have acted in a manner that is an express violation of the 
Constitution “beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.). The body of government who has 
been expressly granted the power to act must be given room to sufficiently do so. (Ibid., 
10). Thayer specifically mentions how the Court is not to read in its own interpretations 
and therefore “step into the shoes of the law-maker.” (Ibid., 26). Therefore, “[u]nder no 
system can the power of courts go far to save people from ruin, our chief protection lies 
elsewhere.” (Ibid., 30).  
It is this interpretation of Thayer and his argument that will be the underlying 
theme and interpretation used in the following arguments throughout the remaining 
chapters. Thayer has presented a clear argument as to why the Court has been 
historically limited and gives a straight-forward standard that the Court must follow 
when making Constitutional determinations. Such an interpretation has set a foundation 
to prevent and alleviate the fear of political interference by the Court. However, many 
political theorists, including John Hart Ely, Ronald Dworkin, and Cass R. Sunstein would 
argue that Thayer’s proposal does not extend far enough in granting the Court 
necessary powers. 
Modern political theorists still strongly debate as to how the Constitution should 
be viewed, especially in the realm of “Judicial Review,” which has been defined by the 
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Black’s Law Dictionary: Third Pocket Edition as the “power to review the actions of other 
branches or levels of government; [especially] the courts’ power to invalidate legislative 
and executive actions as being unconstitutional.” (Black’s Law s.v. “judicial review”). No 
matter the view, many theorists would argue that Thayer’s textualist view does not 
allow enough Court interaction. The issue of how far the Court should interfere with the 
political processes has itself remained a very controversial area for debate throughout 
America’s political history. The main divide falls between two large encompassing 
groups, Interpretivism and Non-Interpretivism.  
Within the Interpretivism camp we see those who believe “judges deciding 
constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or 
clearly implicit in the written Constitution.” (Ely 1980, 1). If the Court is to strike down 
the actions of the political branches, it must base its decisions on something that can be 
found within the Constitution. (Ibid., 2). Instead, the Constitution and all its differing 
sections should be seen as “self-contained units” that should only be defined by their 
language and the accompanying legislative history. (Ibid., 12-13).  
However, the Interpretivist approach towards Constitutional review by the Court 
seems to be the least accepted amongst Constitutional theorists, mainly because the 
interpretation of any text such as the Constitution will always allow for interpretive 
principles in deciding for substantive rights; “[t]he meaning of any text, including the 
Constitution, is inevitably and always a function of interpretive principles, and these are 
inevitably and always a product of substantive commitments.” (Sunstein 1993, 8). 
Furthermore, the driving force behind Interpretivism fails to address that many of the 
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most important clauses of the Constitution were written in largely vague terms. (Ibid., 
93-94). If the Constitution were limited to an Interpretivist, or a more 
formalistic/originalist reading, the rights of American citizens would be very limited, 
with no terms containing such rights as the right to privacy, one-person-one-vote, or 
terms preventing compulsory sterilization, higher scrutiny for discrimination based on 
sex, or terms preventing affirmative action. (Ibid., 97). 
Non-Interpretivism instead argues “that courts should go beyond that set of 
references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the 
document.” (Ely 1980, 1). Places to which judges may look for outside principles of law 
and interpretation include, but are not limited to “the judge’s own values,” “natural 
law,” “neutral principles,” “reason,” “tradition,” or “consensus.” (Ibid., 43-72). However, 
it is how far the Court should be able to reach beyond the Constitution that brings about 
much debate within the Non-Interpretivist view. 
A. John Hart Ely 
John Hart Ely argues that the Court should be limited in its actions and instead 
lean towards a more “participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to 
judicial review.” (Ibid., 87). Ely states that the idea of Interpretivism holds our traditional 
notions of how law works, but the voices to which the Constitution interprets are those 
“of the people who have been dead for a century or two.” (Ibid., 11). Furthermore, the 
idea of a “clause-bound” interpretation of the Constitution is difficult to make. (Ibid., 11-
41).  
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Ely instead argues that the Constitution itself leaves the idea of substantive 
values to the political branches of government and instead concerns itself mainly “with 
procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes . . . “ (Ibid., 87). Throughout 
the early history of the American colonies, many constitutional claims made by the 
residents were, more often than not, participatory or jurisdictional. (Ibid., 89). Early 
legal challenges focused upon the lack of citizen input into the government and the 
unequal distribution of certain rights. (Ibid.). That is why, as Ely observes, the main body 
of the original Constitution is dedicated to structuring the government and its 
procedural actors, not at identifying specific substantive values. (Ibid., 92). Even the 
addition of the Bill of Rights focused more upon procedural protection of political 
participation for both majority and minority groups. (Ibid., 93-98). Also, the 
development of the Constitution after the Civil War had “extended the franchise” to 
other minority groups in the political system. (Ibid., 99). This shows the Constitutional 
theme from its inception has been “the achievement of a political process open to all on 
an equal basis and a consequent enforcement of the representative’s duty of equal 
concern and respect to minorities and majorities alike.” (Ibid.).  
Ely states that because our Constitutional and governmental history has been 
driven more towards a proper representative democracy, it shows how improper it is for 
judges to echo what values Americans hold over elected representatives. (Ibid., 102). 
Instead, the Court should devote “itself instead to policing the mechanisms by which the 
system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually represent.” (Ibid.). 
Ely gives what he calls a “referee analogy” towards judicial participation based on the 
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procedural nature of the Constitution. (Ibid., 103). Here, the Court does not “dictate 
substantive results” but only steps in when the governmental system is malfunctioning, 
not when an opposing side has won and a justice disagrees with the outcome; but only 
when “the channels of political change” are blocked or when the majority is 
continuously taking minority interests away. (Ibid., 102-03). A few areas the Court can 
therefore review, without any doubt, are “impediments to free speech, publication, and 
political association.” (Ibid., 105).  
Therefore, the Court should preeminently focus upon “unblocking stoppages in 
the democratic process” such as voting restrictions. (Ibid., 117). In the context of voting 
rights, the Courts should not be deciding who participates and who doesn’t, but instead 
whether the reasons for denial of voting rights are “convincing,” instead of there being a 
denial for “no reason.” (Ibid., 120). The legislature must be seen as having a “policy 
direction” in which it is heading. (Ibid., 133). Therefore, it is within the legislature that 
we can finally determine whether there has been a proper majority for us to proceed. 
(Ibid., 134). Such a consensus of the people cannot be found in the realm of unelected 
judges. (Ibid.). Instead the Court should let our legislators actually legislate in order for 
us to see the policy direction in which the legislature is heading. (Ibid.). However, Ely’s 
proposal fails to take into consideration the Court overstepping into other areas of 
public policy under the guise of trying to help, and allow for more citizen political 
participation.  
There is no doubt that it is the government’s job to help protect the political 
participation of its citizens. However, even though Ely seemingly aims at maintaining a 
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more democratic process, which seemed to be the underlying purpose for Thayer, the 
limited role Ely proposes could still lead to large interference by the Court than shown. 
As was the case in Lochner v. New York, where the Court gave its own very broad 
reading of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause to include the principle of “Liberty 
of Contract,” the Court under Ely’s standard could apply the same method under the 
right of political participation. (Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1905).). The 
Court could under the specific instances mentioned by Ely; freedom of speech, 
publication, and political association; give its own broad reading of the First Amendment 
to include a vast array of unintended variations of speech and association to restrict any 
actions that could possibly be taken by the legislature, even when helping the 
participation of any previously restricted minority group. As will be shown, this over-
breadth can be seen in the modern cases of Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. 
In any instance, Ely’s “referee analogy” can still be applicable under the standard 
advocated by Thayer. The Court would still devote “itself instead to policing mechanisms 
by which the system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually 
represent.” (Ely 1980, 102). However, the Court will not be able to interfere to the 
degree to which Ely states, but only when there is a clear-cut constitutional violation as 
promoted by Thayer. 
B. Ronald Dworkin 
Ronald Dworkin, in a more expansive manner, argues for a broad reach of the 
Court in determining Constitutional principles. Dworkin begins his argument by stating 
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that the decisions the Court makes are always political in nature because they always 
resolve a dispute over a political issue that will favor one political group over another. 
(Dworkin 1985, 9). Therefore, the issue should not be whether the Court should make 
political decisions, but whether it should make those decisions on “political grounds.” 
(Ibid.). Dworkin’s overall principle lays on the idea that “judges do and should rest their 
judgments on controversial cases on arguments of political principle, but not in 
arguments of political policy.” (Ibid., 11). First, Dworkin sees that the courts should have 
the power to change legislation, because if such legislation has remained vague as to 
what the true basis of judgment should be, the Court must make the determination as 
to how it must be enforced. (Ibid., 18-19). Furthermore, the argument that the 
legislature is a more appropriate body to make politically principled decisions lacks any 
substantial evidence to show that such legislative decisions are “more likely to be 
correct than judicial decisions.” (Ibid., 24). In addition, “the technique of examining a 
claim of right for speculative consistency is a technique far more developed in judges 
than in legislators or in the bulk of the citizens who elect legislators.” (Ibid.). 
Institutionally, judges are not under the pressures of re-election from the constituency 
as are legislators, and therefore are more likely to reach more correct and sound 
decisions. (Ibid., 25).  
Dworkin remains correct in the assumption that the Court makes decisions that 
are political in nature because they resolve a political controversy. There is no avoiding 
this type of decision. However, the Court must answer any of these types of questions in 
a strictly legal manner without any political or partisan interference. Dworkin does make 
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a very compelling distinction between decisions of “political principle” and “political 
policy.” (See Ibid., 11). However, allowing any political ideals, even principle, to come 
into a strictly legal decision allows the justices to consider far more ideals than what the 
law simply says. This may reach past the true reasons for why the legislature passed the 
law, by allowing the Court to consider degrees of necessity based on their individual 
principles. 
As far as what Dworkin says about the Court being a principled body, the 
legislature has always been the body and voice of the people, because it voices the rules 
that controls the rights of all citizens. (Hamilton 1961, 464). It has always been the 
house of political debate and reason. The Constitution specifically grants the legislature 
the powers over determination of what is necessary, because without this 
determination, the legislature cannot act at all. (Thayer 1893, 9). The Court in the view 
of the Founding Fathers, as shown in Federalist 78, was meant to only view violations 
against the “manifest tenor of the Constitution.” (Hamilton 1961, 465). The Court was to 
be the far weakest of the three branches of government; “the judiciary from the nature 
of its function, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.” (Ibid., 464). 
It was the legislature who was meant to ensure rights of the People and how such are to 
be regulated; “[t]he legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by 
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.” (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, judges may be under no pressures of re-election, but this may also 
be seen as a very negative consequence, which Dworkin seems to ignore. Judges, 
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because of their lack of credibility to the people, may simply ignore the public opinion 
favoring any type of reformation of policy. By being unelected officials, it seems having a 
Court who may interfere into the discretionary arena of determining public policy 
ignores the democratic justifications behind a limited Court. Based on Thayer’s 
explanations, there seemed to be historical precedent in limiting a Court in the 
democratic process. Because the Founders found it necessary to not give the Court, who 
remained unelected, the powers of the legislature, the Court should remain separate 
from those policy determinations made by elected officials. The Lochner-era remains a 
perfect example of this type of threat. By the time Lochner v. New York was overturned, 
“most Americans had soberly repudiated the old views.” (Ackerman 1998, 376). With 
the onset of the Great Depression, the people, wanted and needed, change and so “the 
People had spoken decisively on behalf of activist national government,” and it was the 
Court preventing the application of this strong public opinion. (Ibid., 377). 
In addition to his argument that the Court is as principled as the legislature, 
Dworkin responds to the notion of the Court deciding only procedural issues argued by 
Ely above. Dworkin initially agrees with the idea that the Court should respond to 
procedural-based decisions, but “not in order to avoid substantive political questions,” 
instead to simply answer the question before the Court. (Dworkin 1985, 58). Dworkin 
further deviates from Ely’s ideals by arguing that the institution of democracy does not 
support only the Court making process-based decisions, but allows for the Court to 
determine a wider jurisprudence including substantive decisions. (Ibid., 59). Ely’s 
argument is described as defining democracy in one specific concept and that the Court 
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should be limited to identifying and protecting that specific concept. (Ibid.). Instead, 
Dworkin argues that it is a mistake to believe, as Ely does, that procedural judicial 
review could be applied without judges having to face some type of substantive 
decision. (Ibid., 66). “Judges must decide that pure utilitarianism is wrong, for example, 
and that people do have rights that trump both maximization of unrestricted utility and 
the majoritarian decisions that serve unrestricted utility.” (Ibid.). The idea that the Court 
can only be about protecting process versus substantive rights is misleading because 
one must choose what substantive theory makes one process correct over another. 
(Ibid.). Judges cannot make such a theoretical decision without first determining which 
substantive rights they believe over another within each given theory. (Ibid., 67).  
It may seem impossible to ask judges to ignore their own personal theoretical 
interpretations and subjective views when interpreting the law, but the judges must do 
their absolute best to try and prevent such subjective interference. Chief Justice John 
Marshall specifically stated in Marbury v. Madison that decisions of political discretion 
were not to be left to the Court. (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137, 166 (1803).). 
I believe this can be held to also apply to how judges are to interpret the Constitution. 
The judges in any case must remain in full compliance with the specific letter of the law 
in determining each outcome. If the language remains vague, it is the legislative intent 
that must control over any ambiguity, not Court discretion. If requiring the legislature to 
give its reasoning for passing Constitutionally significant laws needs to occur, then such 
a practice should be established. If instead, the Court were to substitute its own 
discretion over that of the legislature’s, as was the case in Lochner v. New York, then the 
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law cannot be implemented to prevent the harms to which it was aimed. (Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).). The letter of the law and the intentions of the 
legislature must be the controlling factors over interpretation of the law, not how 
judges on their own accord decide how to bend the words as they see fit. 
If, as Dworkin says, the Court should make “decisions about what rights people 
have under our Constitutional system,” then we will systematically run into the 
roadblock issues the nation faced during the Lochner-era. (Dworkin 1985, 69). If the 
Court becomes the body determining what specific rights we as citizens possess, the 
Court, as in Lochner, will become the final arbiter of what any public policy is based on 
its own definitions. The Court could then arbitrarily determine any right citizens do or do 
not possess whenever they felt it was needed; without any substantive evidence or 
debate that Congress is supposed to conduct in consideration of its own decisions. 
In the end, Dworkin believes that we must accept the Court making political 
decisions if we accept the overall idea of Judicial Review on any level. (Ibid.). The Court 
should only be limited to choices of principle over policy; “decisions about what rights 
people have under our constitutional system rather than decisions about how the 
general welfare is best promoted.” (Ibid.). In order to make these decisions, the Court 
must not remain passive:  
Passivists cite Lochner and other cases in which the Supreme Court, 
wrongly, it is now agreed, appealed to individual rights to forestall or 
cripple desirable and just legislative programs. But we would have more 
to regret if the Court had accepted passivism wholeheartedly: southern 
schools might still be segregated, for example. Indeed, if we were to 
collect the Court’s decisions most generally regretted over the course of 
constitutional history, we would find more in which its mistake lay in 
failing to intervene when, as we now think, constitutional principles of 
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justice required intervention. Americans would be prouder of their 
political record if it did not include, for example, Plessy or Korematsu. In 
both these cases a decision of a majoritarian legislature was seriously 
unjust and also as most lawyers now believe, unconstitutional; we regret 
that the Supreme Court did not intervene for justice in the Constitution’s 
name. (Dworkin 1986, 375-76). 
 
However, what Dworkin fails to consider in arguing against a passive Court is the 
effects that the Court leaves when it takes a more active or aggressive role. When the 
Court takes a stand and gets their decision wrong as against public opinion or policy 
trying to be promoted to help society by Congress or any other legislature, it may result 
in another Lochner-era. As its been discussed, the Court going against such opinion can 
create a large road-block in the implementation of legislation that is trying to be passed 
for the betterment of society or the economy. Though, when the Court has acted 
strongly against such progress, nothing can be done until the Court has moved away 
from its stance. Furthermore, when the Court gets it right and moves in the same 
direction as the legislature, the Court has been shown to not have a real strong public 
impact on its decisions. Cass R. Sunstein talks about research conducted that statistically 
shows the true impact of the Court. (Sunstein 1993, 146-47). This research is discussed 
in full in The Hollow Hope by Gerald N. Rosenberg. Rosenberg discusses how there is no 
statistical evidence that has shown the Court is the political body that introduces 
societal concerns or policy to the people. (Rosenberg 2008, 121). “Most Americans 
neither follow Supreme Court decisions nor understand the Court’s constitutional role. 
It is not surprising, then, that change in public opinion appears to be oblivious to the 
Court.” (Ibid., 131). Events show, especially in the context of the Civil Rights Movement, 
that the number of demonstrations and political activism over minority rights began 
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before the action taken by the Court in deciding Brown v. Board. (Ibid., 135). “[G]rowing 
civil rights pressure from the 1930s, economic changes, the Cold War, population shifts, 
electoral concerns, the increase in mass communication–created the pressure that led 
to civil rights. The Court reflected that pressure, it did not create it.” (Ibid., 169). This 
same increase in activism before Court action could also be seen in other public policy 
areas, specifically abortion. Beginning in 1966, there was a sharp increase in the amount 
of abortions way before the Court case of Roe v. Wade in 1973. (Ibid., 179). The active 
Court as Dworkin sees it, is not the body of change. When the Court takes the path away 
from public opinion, large problems may occur. Yet, when the Court goes in the same 
direction, it is not the body of change as one may believe. 
C. Cass R. Sunstein 
Lastly, Cass R. Sunstein argues for a limited role of the Court in a more 
democratic manner. Sunstein first begins by discussing the idea of “Status Quo 
Neutrality.” (Sunstein 1993, 3). This idea consists of the baseline decisions for what 
people and certain groups possess in rights and entitlements. (Ibid.). “A departure from 
the status quo signals partisanship; respect for the status quo signals neutrality.” (Ibid.). 
Any choice the government makes against the current status quo is seen as “action” 
versus remaining the same being seen as “inaction.” (Ibid.). However, Sunstein sets out 
to first state that the idea of a status quo neutrality as an ideal, is largely a mistake. 
“Status quo neutrality disregards the fact that existing rights, and hence the status quo, 
are in an important sense products of law. It is a matter of simple fact that people own 
things only because the law permits them to do so.” (Ibid., 4). People have tended to 
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forget that our entitlements have derived from law and the constitution and not 
necessarily from nature. (Ibid., 5). Therefore, the argument that status quo neutrality 
must be held stable is a mistake because the entitlements we look to change by law 
originally grew out of the old law and are now simply being changed to the given 
circumstances. (Ibid.).  
This type of thinking, in the view of Sunstein, has allowed for a mistaken “court-
centeredness” view towards the American constitution. (Ibid., 9). Instead, the 
interpretation should be directed more towards a “general commitment to deliberative 
democracy.” (Ibid., 123). Sunstein states that there are a couple of reasons as to why 
the Court should be limited in its powers. First, the Courts have a variety of institutional 
limitations that are placed upon its powers. (Ibid., 145). Sunstein states that relying on 
the courts “may impair democratic channels for seeking changes, and in two ways. It 
might divert energy and resources from politics, and the eventual judicial decision may 
foreclose a political outcome.” (Ibid.). If a political outcome is stopped by the courts, the 
democratic process itself is damaged due to the stoppage of other political channels 
through elections and debates. (Ibid.). Sunstein discusses how, in response to this 
argument for a limited Court, Ronald Dworkin’s argument for a more active Court, being 
a “forum of principle,” failed to consider how the Court was not the only body of 
government to be seen as a principled institution. (Ibid., 146). If all principled decisions 
were left to the Court, each would disregard the American ideal of democratic politics 
by forgoing a deliberative government and reviewing any of the possibilities that could 
be observed in practice. (Ibid.). 
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Second, as a matter of efficacy, the Court is lacking. (Ibid.). The Court has been 
historically seen as ineffective in bringing about any major social change. (Ibid.). The 
limited focus of adjudication limits the scope any case could possibly have upon social 
reform. (Ibid., 147). Litigated cases are always limited in their scope to simply the case 
and facts at hand. (Ibid.). Judges are prevented from understanding “the complex, often 
unpredictable effects of legal intervention” due to the limited nature of litigation. (Ibid., 
148).  
They [judges] are in a poor position to assess the relationship between 
that right and other desirable social goals, including the provisions of 
training and employment programs, not to mention incentives for 
productive work. Judicial recognition of a right to subsistence might also 
have harmful effects on democratic deliberation about various methods 
for helping poor people out of poverty; it might even preempt such 
democratic effects. (Ibid., 149). 
 
However, to Sunstein this does not mean the Courts should simply abandon legal 
determinations upon the Constitution. (Ibid.). As a principle, the idea of status quo 
neutrality should be left to the democratic processes where the Court should simply 
uphold legislation that retains status quo entitlements while also being “inclined to 
validate legislation attempting to disrupt them.” (Ibid.). Therefore, the Court is there to 
make sure that those within the other branches live up to their own departmental 
responsibilities derived under the Constitution. (Ibid., 158).  
The arguments made by Sunstein and Thayer have a lot of overlap, but one key 
difference remains. Sunstein and his political system rely heavily on the democratic 
process of debate and representation. The people and their representatives are to 
determine whether or not to maintain the status quo. (Ibid., 146). However, Thayer 
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remains indifferent towards the overall status quo. As a textualist, Thayer believes that 
if the process and powers are within the Constitution, the people have spoken and that 
granted method is to control, without any regard to whether it keeps or changes the 
status quo, even if not within the democratic process. (See Thayer 1893). 
Yet, it is Thayer’s argument that remains strong. The American Constitution has 
specifically laid out the various roles of each branch of government. If the democratic 
process was to have unbridled power to determine the variance of the status quo, it 
would have been granted such powers. Additionally, if the American system wanted the 
status quo within the Constitution to be altered in a more open manner, it would have 
allowed for Constitutional amendment in a less restrictive manner. Furthermore, as 
described by Thayer, the concept of judicial review has remained in political practice 
since the time of English courts in the colonies. (Thayer 1893, 4). The Court, under 
Article III of the United States Constitution, was given full power of review within 
various arenas, including issues arising under the Constitution and those amongst the 
States. Sunstein remains correct that the Court has not brought about social change in 
the manner that the legislatures have and that the Courts should make sure those in the 
other branches remain within the Constitution; with statistical data backing up this 
assertion. (Sunstein 1993, 146-47; See Rosenberg 2008). However, it should be the text 
of the Constitution that determines the status quo and its variances. If the democratic 
process were to have unbridled power over such decisions, then the Constitution and 
the American form of government would have been formed in such a manner. 
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The difference between Sunstein and Thayer can be seen in decisions revolving 
around political campaign financing. Based off of Sunstein’s theory, if Congress 
seemingly passed a law with a complete ban on private funding and only permitted 
public funding, this law would remain constitutional because it was the democratic 
process and legislature that determined to deviate from the status quo, even with it 
being a complete ban on private funding and speech. However, under the theory 
advocated by Thayer, this type of complete ban would be an obvious constitutional 
violation, beyond any reasonable doubt, because it implements a complete ban on a 
certain type of private speech. It is in this type of decision where Thayer’s ideology and 
theory remains superior to Sunstein’s even though only slightly different. However, in 
the context of the cases to be discussed later, Sunstein would agree fully in the 
determinations to be made and no difference applies between Sunstein and Thayer. 
Overall, there are a vast number of ways to argue for or against extensive judicial 
participation in the political process. Each theorist above gives extensive and far 
reaching arguments that have constitutional grounds within the American political 
system. However, the problem still remains on what a clear violation of the Constitution 
is when permitting Court interference via judicial review. Thayer does not delve enough 
into the idea by only stating the violation must be “beyond a reasonable doubt” and 
that the decision by the Court must only be “a naked judicial one.” (Thayer 1893, 9; 25). 
As long as there is no real definitive standard on what meets beyond any reasonable 
doubt, too much discretion lays with the Court to determine which cases may or may 
not come before them. First and foremost, as a baseline standard the constitutional 
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violation must still remain on the face of the complaint under the “Well-pleaded 
Complaint” rule under the Black’s Law Dictionary: Third Pocket Edition, where the 
violation must be able to be seen on the face of the complaint instead of only being 
derived out of a defense to the challenge or determined later by a judge on his/her own 
accord. (Black’s Law s.v. “well-pleaded complaint”). Though, what is a clear-cut 
constitutional violation?  
Before giving a final definition, a division must be made between when the 
Constitution gives the legislature an express grant of power and when the Constitution 
is lacking in an express grant. It seemed Thayer lacked an exact distinction between 
express grants and implied powers. However, one must be made for that Congressional 
power would seem to be more concrete and implicit when the Constitution specifically 
grants powers versus when they are simply implied elsewhere. When the Constitution 
gives an exact grant of power to the legislature, such as in Article I, Section 8 and the 
14th Amendment Enforcement Clause, Congress should have absolute and plenary 
discretion in acting within those specific powers. Therefore, any conceivably reasonable 
determination made by the legislature in acting should be sufficient for Constitutional 
action. The Court itself in the cases of James Everard’s Breweries v. Day and Edward & 
John Burke v. Blair itself admitted that when Congress acts under any granted powers 
the Court “may not inquire into the degree of their necessity.” (James Everdard’s 
Breweries v. Day; Edward & John Burke v. Blair, 265 U.S. 545, 559 (1924).). The violation 
must be of an expressed right given in another part of the Constitution. (Ibid.). Full 
discretion must be placed upon the legislature and the legislature alone. This is where 
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Thayer’s standard of a Constitutional violation of being “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
should hold true. 
Yet, when the legislature has been given only implied powers in any 
Constitutional arena, the power remains strong, but not absolute as when the powers 
have been expressly granted. Here, the standard of power to which the Court should 
relinquish to the legislature should follow the reasoning given by Chief Justice John 
Marshall in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland. As will be discussed in Chapter III, Chief 
Justice Marshall determined that when Congress is acting under its “incidental or 
implied powers” given to it, and no other Constitutional provision expressly limits such 
actions, the Court may not interfere in Congressional action when the actions taken 
were seen as legitimate and appropriate. (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4 Wheat. 316, 
406; 421 (1819).). It is Congress to which the Court should relinquish the determination 
of what is necessary. (Ackerman 1991, 332 n. 30). The Court should simply determine 
whether Congress was able to give any simple or legitimate reasoning for the legislation, 
unless it violates the express wording of the Constitution itself. This is slightly less 
restrictive upon the Court in that, beyond a reasonable doubt requires substantial proof 
and no sensible doubt that there has been a Constitutional violation, while this lesser 
standard looks at whether the benefit of action outweighs the benefits of inaction. This 
difference resembles the differences the Plaintiff, in this instance the Court, must 
overcome in criminal versus civil trials. However, this standard still strongly favors 
legislative action, but is slightly less strict upon the Court than when the legislature has 
been given express powers under the Constitution. 
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In the end, this does not leave the legislature with unlimited powers with the 
Court helplessly sitting on the sidelines. The Court still remains a principled body of law 
because it has been granted the power of judicial review even when not specifically 
granted within the Constitution. It is the Court that still remains the highest body of 
American law. Furthermore, even with the Court still restricted under the proposed 
system, the People of the nation will still be protected by other checks upon the 
legislature if the political body steps out of bounds without Court intervention. The 
Constitution still permits the Executive to have the power of enforcement, and if the 
legislation is undoubtedly unconstitutional and the Court has yet to act or is restricted 
from doing so, the Executive can still refuse enforcement and make the law a dead 
letter.  
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CHAPTER III: THE PROGRESSION OF THE COURT 
Neither the written form nor the oath of the judges necessarily involves 
the right of reversing, displacing, or disregarding any action of the 
legislature or the executive which these departments are constitutionally 
authorized to take, or the determination of those departments that they 
are so authorized. 
- James Bradley Thayer 
(Thayer 1893, 4) 
 
 
Because the Constitution is silent on the issue of judicial review over the acts 
taken by either the legislative or executive branches, the argument over judicial review 
has not only become theoretical, but has also been one of great legal significance. Not 
only have political and constitutional theorists debated constitutional interpretation and 
the proper role of the United States Supreme Court in the overall government, the Court 
itself has long showed, it too, does not fully know or understand how far its own powers 
reach in the political process. A brief glimpse over the history of Court decisions can 
show that the Court has pushed and pulled its powers in and out of the political arena 
on numerous occasions. This process has not just taken place at one specific time in the 
Court’s history, but has come and gone over the entire course of American history. This 
fluctuation can be seen in, but not limited to, the cases of Marbury v. Madison, 
McCulloch v. Maryland, Hammer v. Dagenhart, Lochner v. New York, West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, United States v. Darby, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.. 
In the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court, led by Chief 
Justice John Marshall, took what has been historically seen as the largest step by legally 
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establishing judicial review over the political process. The case arose when William 
Marbury was denied his appointment as a minor judicial officer by then President 
Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison. (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 
Cranch 137, 153-54 (1803).). In determining whether Marbury was entitled to his 
commission, Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion for the Court, first determined 
whether the Court itself could hear such a case involving the act of governmental 
appointments made by another branch. (Ibid., 154). Chief Justice Marshall determined 
that the Court had the power within the constitution to determine whether actions 
made by governmental branches are in violation of the peoples’ rights and whether any 
injury is placed upon those rights. (Ibid., 166). 
But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend 
upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the 
individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws 
of his country for a remedy. (Ibid.). 
 
However, Chief Justice Marshall did not allow an unrestricted grant of power 
upon the Court and therefore limited the scope of review the Court may conduct upon 
governmental acts. (Ibid., 165-66). This limitation fell upon the idea that the Court may 
not review discretionary or political questions made by the Executive Branch of the 
government. (Ibid.). “By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested 
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own 
discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own 
conscience.” (Ibid.). When the executive or his agents make any decision based on his 
“constitutional or legal discretion,” the Court may not review the action as they are 
“only politically examinable.” (Ibid., 166). Chief Justice Marshall did not argue that the 
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Court had a “‘counter-majoritarian’” duty or that there were natural rights underlying 
Court action that allowed for judicial review; he instead anchored the principle in the 
idea that the Constitution was the highest law of the land and that the People must be 
protected from its “erosion by normal lawmaking.” (Ackerman 1991, 72). However, this 
action by the Court to overturn a national statute was one of only two such actions 
taken by the Court during the early years of American history; the other being Dred 
Scott v. Sandford. (Ibid., 63). 
In another landmark case, Chief Justice Marshall took a different approach and 
instead decided to enlarge the powers granted to Congress under the Constitution. In 
McCulloch v. Maryland, the State of Maryland tried to tax the Federal Reserve Bank 
branch located within the State. (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4 Wheat. 316, 317 
(1819).). In denying the legality of the taxation and allowing for the establishment of the 
bank, Chief Justice Marshall determined that under the “Necessary and Proper Clause” 
of the Constitution, art. I, §8, cl. 18, Congress had the power to further its enumerated 
powers with the use of “incidental or implied powers” because no constitutional phrase 
limits such application. (Ibid., 406-412). The Court may not interfere into such legislative 
powers as long as the ends to the actions are legitimate; “let it be within the scope of 
the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, 
are Constitutional.” (Ibid., 421). The final determination of what was in fact necessary or 
proper was to be left to Congress itself. (Ackerman 1991, 332 n. 30). This determination 
favored a more “nationalistic approach to the un-enumerated powers granted Congress 
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by the original Constitution, and cast the Court as an aggressive warrior against state 
efforts to undermine the Congressional exercise of these powers.” (Ibid., 74). 
However, one of the largest steps in expanding the powers of the Court and 
restricting the powers of the legislature came in 1905 with the case of Lochner v. New 
York. The case arose in 1897 when New York State passed a law restricting the hours a 
baker may work to 60 per week. (Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905).). The 
Court determined the law to be in violation of the 14th Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause due to its restriction upon the “Liberty of Contract.” (Ibid., 53-54). “The general 
right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” (Ibid., 53). Even 
though there seemed to be a showing of evidence that longer hours of work could in 
fact affect the production of bakers, the Court instead determined that “any law . . . 
might find shelter under such assumptions, and conduct, properly so called . . . would 
come under the restrictive sway of the legislature.” (Ibid., 58-60). The Court appeared to 
have made such an argument in order to try and display any underlying motives the 
legislature had in passing the law. (Horwitz 1992, 30). “In short, every time a legislature 
offered statistics to argue that there was a continuum of unhealthy occupations, a 
court, suspecting its redistributive motives, needed to inquire whether the particular 
occupation in question was ‘in and of itself’ unhealthy.” (Ibid.). The Court seemed to 
ignore that the development of the industrial age in America would bring about 
redistribution of wealth with the development of inequality in the work place and 
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economy, and that the common law methods of protecting stability were becoming less 
likely to apply. (Ibid.).  
Under the theory prescribed in Chapter II, the Court had begun to overstep its 
judicial authority in Lochner. The States had been granted an implied authority under 
the Constitution based on their so called “police powers.” (Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45, 53 (1905).). These powers included action to help the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizens. (Ibid.). Therefore, as long as the New York legislature was able to give a 
legitimate and appropriate reason for enacting the hours law, the Court should not have 
interfered. 
However, as was shown the Court simply ignored the legislature’s reasoning and 
instead read into the law its own conjecture of an underlying legislative motive. 
(Horwitz 1992, 30). Furthermore, the Court read into the Due Process Clause the idea of 
a liberty of contract which is not an express right granted under the Constitution. 
Therefore, because there were no express Constitutional violations by the New York 
legislature, the Court under the proposed theory, had failed to give proper 
consideration towards the legislature’s legitimate concern over worker health and 
safety. Instead the Court used the Constitutional principle of liberty of contract as an 
excuse to limit legislative action and failed to give the legislature due consideration and 
deference over the health and welfare of its citizens. 
By determining the law did not fall under the “police powers” of the state, the 
statute was in violation of “liberty” protected by the 14th Amendment. (Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-57 (1905).). The Court set in motion what would become known as 
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the “Lochner-era” of the Supreme Court where the Court consistently struck down 
economic reform legislation by Congress. This era of Supreme Court history has come to 
be seen “as a (complex) story about the fall from grace – wherein most of the Justices 
strayed from the path of righteousness and imposed their laissez-faire philosophy on 
the nation through the pretext of constitutional interpretation.” (Ackerman 1991, 42-
43). By doing so, the Court gave to itself the expansive power of defining the scope to 
which legislatures, later including Congress, may act, by being the body who defines 
“liberty” under the Due Process Clause. The precedent set by Lochner would again be 
affirmed in 1923 with the case of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.  (See Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).). 
The limitation of Congressional powers and the expansion of Court power was 
not only limited to the 14th Amendment during the “Lochner-era.” In the case of 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court expanded its reach over the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution, art. I, §8. In this case, the Court determined that Congress did not have the 
power under the Commerce Clause to enact a law prohibiting the transportation of 
goods in interstate commerce that were made in violation of certain restrictions upon 
child labor. (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268-69 (1918).). The Court held that 
commerce contained a very restrictive definition, which in turn substantially restricted 
the actions Congress could take; “[t]he manufacture of goods is not commerce, nor do 
the facts that they are intended for, and are afterwards shipped in, interstate commerce 
make their production a part of that commerce subject to the control of Congress.” 
(Ibid., syllabus 251). The Court restricted Congressional reach over manufacturing only 
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to occasions when it is in “accomplishment of harmful results.” (Ibid., 271). “If Congress 
could not take steps to express the nation’s condemnation of a shocking abuse like child 
labor, its powers were limited indeed.” (Ackerman 1998, 257). As was the case in 
Lochner, the Court seemed to have taken it upon itself to define what “commerce” was 
under the Constitution, restricting the scope of Congressional power under its 
enumerated power granted by the same clause. This case began to mark the final 
acquiescence to the Court. (Urofsky and Finkelman 2011, 619). The support against child 
labor was widespread across the nation and therefore the Court’s decision in Hammer 
became a surprise to a nation trying to reform economic conditions, showing the 
jurisprudence of the Court during this time period would eventually come to an end. 
(Ibid.). 
Beginning in 1937, with the end of the “Lochner-era,” the Court started to shift 
power back to the legislature by overturning the cases Lochner and Hammer. This new 
regime change would begin to strike down the leading decisions arising out of the 
“Lochner-era” and would give a broader view towards legislative and executive 
lawmaking. (Ackerman 1991, 42; Ackerman 1998, 26). The new Court would begin to 
show the nation they were no longer following the view of a limited government. 
(Ackerman 1998, 263). In the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court took one 
final step in overturning the type of judicial review associated with Lochner by departing 
from Lochner-type constitutional interpretation. (Ibid., 400). In determining the validity 
of a Washington State minimum wage law for women and minors, the Court shifted 
back to Congress’ large discretion when acting under the 14th Amendment. (West Coast 
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Hotel, Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 387 (1937).). The Court held that “liberty” under the 
14th Amendment Due Process Clause is not “an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.” 
(Ibid., at 391). By limiting such a right, the Court determined that Congress may act 
within reasonable grounds in which the “health, safety, morals, and welfare” of the 
people are protected. (Ibid.). “Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject 
to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its 
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.” (Ibid.). 
Similarly, by 1941 it seemed clear that most Americans were now rejecting the 
ways of the Lochner-era. (Ackerman 1998, 376). The Court, in United States v. Darby, 
further relinquished powers back to the legislature, this time in the realm of interstate 
commerce, moving away from the previous decision rendered in Hammer. The Court 
had to determine the constitutionality of a Congressional act that prohibited the 
transportation in interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by companies who were 
in violation of prescribed employee wage and hours limits. (United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100, 108 (1941).). While upholding the statute, the Court again shifted large 
discretional powers back to Congress. The Court reasoned that Congressional control 
over interstate commerce reached farther than just the actual transportation of goods 
and into the process and manufacturing of those goods:  
While manufacture is not, of itself, interstate commerce, the shipment of 
manufactured goods interstate is such commerce, and the prohibition of 
such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of the commerce. 
The power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by 
which commerce is governed. (Ibid., 113). 
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The Court determined that Congress could act under its enumerated power to 
control interstate commerce to its fullest extent only being limited by express 
prohibitions within the Constitution. (Ibid., 114). The Court had now approved 
the idea of Congressional control over noncommercial activities, which was 
previously rejected in Hammer, further ignoring the Lochner-era principles of 
relying upon the common law. (Urofsky and Finkelman 2011, 779; Ackerman 
1998, 373). This therefore became the first time Congress was granted powers to 
fully protect against inadequate labor conditions, previously restricted by the 
Court. (Urofsky and Finkelman 2011, 620). “It no longer made any difference 
why Congress wanted to prohibit the interstate movement of particular goods; 
legislative motive did not matter so long as the power existed.” (Ibid., 778). After 
the issuing of the Darby opinion, the Court would “never again cite Lochner with 
approval.” (Ackerman 1998, 375). 
 The Court has continued its discretion towards the legislature in more 
far-reaching cases such as in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. The case arose in 
1966 when the State of South Carolina filed suit seeking a declaration that 
certain parts of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were unconstitutional and the 
issuance of an injunction to prevent its enforcement. (South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307(1966).). In upholding the law as appropriate, the 
Court determined that Congress had a wider power to enforce Amendments, the 
Fifteenth Amendment for this particular case, beyond the mere general terms of 
the language given in the Constitution. (Ibid., 327). Therefore, the idea that 
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“fashioning specific remedies or applying them to particular localities must 
necessarily be left entirely to the courts” was rejected. (Ibid.). As was the case in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court determined that powers granted to Congress 
within the Constitution are “complete in itself” and can “be exercised to its 
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the 
constitution.” (Ibid.). Therefore, the Court determined that Congress has a large 
range of discretion when enforcing its powers granted under the Constitution 
and may only be restricted when the Constitution says otherwise. The legislation 
must simply be “appropriate” in carrying out the motives the amendments of 
the Constitution have in mind. (Ibid.). With the final determination of what is 
appropriate seemingly being left to Congress. (Ackerman 1991, 332 n. 30). 
Lastly, the Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co., tried to make a final 
determination as to the full extent of the Court’s judicial review powers. In Footnote 4 
of the case, Justice Stone stated: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth . . .  
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about 
repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting 
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions 
upon the right to vote, . . . dissemination of information, . . . on 
interferences with political organizations, . . . as to prohibition of 
peaceable assemply  . . .  
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or 
racial minorities, . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular 
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minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry . . . (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 155 n. 4 (1938).). 
 
This footnote has been seen as the Court stating that it should defer to legislative 
actions in the realm of economics, but also that the Court “should impose higher 
standards of review in areas of civil liberties and civil rights.” (Urofsky and Finkelman 
2011, 791).  This separation tried to create a stronger foothold for the Court in 
fundamental rights, but also tried to maintain in the field of economic rights the 
progressive ideal of judicial restraint. (Horwitz 1992, 252). This proposal “laid the basis 
for differentiated review, one of the contemporary Court’s strongest weapons in its 
defense of individual rights.” (Urofsky and Finkelman 2011, 791).  The idea of Lochner-
era assumptions about implementing the common law seemed to no longer be the 
norm for the Court. (Ackerman 1998, 372). By making such a move, the Court allowed 
minorities and other smaller groups to argue for broader readings of the Constitution. 
(Urofsky and Finkelman 2011, 794).  
 In the end, it seems that the Court, as with many political theorists, have not 
been able to make a final determination as to how the Court may act when 
implementing judicial review. The Court first began by declaring that it contained the 
overall power of judicial review over the acts of the executive and legislature, but 
immediately limited such power to certain non-political circumstances. However, in the 
early 20th Century, the Court took what has historically been seen as a wrong turn 
towards limiting the reformative acts of the legislature in the “Lochner-era,” significantly 
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limiting the actions the legislature may take based on what seems to be the Court’s own 
discretionary definitions of the Constitution. However, since 1937 the Court has 
changed course and expanded the powers granted to the legislature by the 
Constitution. As will be argued in the next chapter of this paper, the Court has in recent 
decades swayed back towards jurisprudence limiting the role and actions of the 
legislature in determining public policy, as seen in the Lochner-era of the Court. The 
argument, in using the before mentioned cases, is that the role of the Court should be 
limited. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE MODERN COURT AND ITS POWER 
Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a people from 
ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere. 
- James Bradley Thayer 
(Thayer 1893, 30) 
 
Now that the various roles of the Supreme Court have been examined, it is time 
to determine where the modern Court has fallen, and whether it has met my proposed 
standard of judicial participation. Since the year 2000, there have been a vast array of 
cases that stand on their own, but 4 specific cases stand above the rest. Those cases are 
Bush v. Gore; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission; Shelby County v. Holder; 
and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. These four cases demonstrate that the 
Court has, in the realm of election law and campaign finance, returned to a Lochner-
type jurisprudence exemplified by the Court in the early 21st-Century. The modern 
application and consequence of the actions the Court took in Lochner v. New York, in 
overstepping its judicial bounds, now further permits the Court to overstep into other 
areas of public policy by the use of legal and constitutional principles. Within each of 
these individual cases, the Court can be seen as taking established constitutional 
principles and applying them in a manner that places itself in the shoes of the 
legislature, becoming the final arbiter of a group of public policy issues. Lastly, before I 
begin, I want to make it known that I do not want to be seen as taking any specific 
partisan side, because that is not my intention. I do not mean to argue for or against the 
specific policy arising out of each case, but the method to which the Court used in 
making such a decision. It is not the outcome I argue against, but the path used to get 
there. 
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A. Bush v. Gore 
First in the line of modern cases is the case that helped determine the 2000 
Presidential election; Bush v. Gore. The case arose during the 2000 presidential election 
when the State of Florida took to a recount to determine the winner of its electoral 
votes for the Presidency. (Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100 (2000).). After the Florida 
Supreme Court demanded a hand recount of disputed votes in various counties 
throughout the State, Republican candidates George W. Bush and Richard Cheney filed 
for an emergency stay against the recount. (Ibid.). The Court would then grant 
certiorari. (Ibid.). The Court held that even though State legislatures are granted the 
power to determine electors for the Presidential election, the States must guarantee 
and maintain equal protection of the law. (Ibid., 106). In the realm of equal protection, 
the State must maintain “[t]he formulation of uniform rules to determine intent” of the 
voter. (Ibid.). However, the Court determined that the differing means between Florida 
counties in the method of recounting votes by hand varied extensively enough to violate 
equal protection. (Ibid.). A recounter in one county may observe a registered vote in a 
far differing manner than someone else in another county. (Ibid.).  
Under the proposed standard of review discussed in the previous chapter, the 
public policy issues arising out of the Court decision over the Florida recount are very 
complex. Article 2, Section 1, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution, states that 
“[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 
Number of Electors,” who will then vote for the Office of President. This Constitutional 
provision implies that any citizen does not have a right under federal law to vote for the 
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electors of Presidential elections. (Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).). It is the state 
legislatures who have the sole power for selecting electors and may grant the power to 
do so to any party, either itself or the people. (Ibid.). The decisions of how the State 
elections for President have been given expressly to the State legislatures, under the 
Constitution, the States therefore should retain full power of such decisions and Court 
interference can only occur with a violation beyond any reasonable doubt. “[W]e defer 
to the agencies unless their interpretation violates ‘the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.’” (Ibid., Ginsburg, dissenting 136). The Court, and other Federal branches, 
have historically left such discretion to the States, and the States alone as a plenary 
power. (Ibid., 104). However, every State legislature has granted the power of selecting 
electors to the people of the State and this vestment of power is fundamental in nature. 
(Ibid.). The federal government will only interfere if voters’ rights have been violated. 
(Ibid., 104-05).  
However, when the Court decided the outcome of this case, it ignored the 
plenary powers of the State of Florida to determine the outcome of the election process 
of their given electors. During the deliberation over the recount, it had been shown that 
there was a large inconsistency within the Florida election code. (Ibid., Breyer, 
dissenting 149). One provision stating that the Florida Secretary of State shall not accept 
votes counted late and another provision stating the Secretary may accept late votes. 
(Ibid.). This type of inconsistency within any State law has historically been left to the 
State courts for clarification. It is to be the State who interprets State law. (Ibid., 
Rehnquist, concurring 114; Ginsburg dissenting 138; 142). The Federal government will 
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only interfere into State interpretation upon exceptional circumstances. (Ibid., 
Rehnquist, concurring 114). In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Ginsburg discusses 
precedent that states that the federal courts will only interfere if the States have 
violated a provision of the Constitution beyond any question of doubt. (Ibid., Ginsburg, 
dissenting 136). Furthermore, in his concurring opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
states that the discretion left to the States seems, as Justice Ginsburg hints, to be similar 
to rational basis. (Ibid., Rehnquist, concurring 115). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that 
Federal court interference will only occur when the “laws [are] impermissibly distorted 
[] beyond what a fair reading [would require].” (Ibid.). However, in its’ per curiam 
opinion, the Court does not seem to give any true discretion towards the Florida 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida law. Simple disagreements as the Court 
seemed to hold, is not enough to allow for the Court to disregard Constitutionally 
acceptable interpretations of law made by the Florida Supreme Court. (Ibid., Ginsburg, 
dissenting 136).  
Overall, the Constitution had granted the specific authority of choosing 
Presidential electors to the States under Article 2, Section 1, Clause 2. Furthermore, 
States had historically granted the power and process to the people by law. Therefore, 
the Court should have only interfered based on an express Constitutional violation 
beyond any reasonable doubt. Even with the inconsistency within the Florida statute 
determining the process of the election, it has historically remained in State hands to 
determine the true meaning of any ambiguities within State law. (Ibid., Rehnquist, 
concurring 114; Ginsburg, dissenting 138; 142). 
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The Court failed to cite an express grant within the Constitution that the State of 
Florida had violated beyond any reasonable doubt. Doubt still had arisen as to whether 
Florida had encountered any unconstitutional behavior. As shown above, the Court 
throughout all the opinions had stated how the States retain considerable powers over 
elections and that there is no set of expressed standards as to when the Court may step 
in. (See Ibid., Rehnquist, concurring 114). Therefore, doubt still remained as to whether 
the Court had given such reason beyond clear doubt in order to legitimately interfere 
into the case at hand. The Court failed to give specific, express Constitutional wording as 
evidence that the State of Florida had issued determinations that would 
unconstitutionally fail to count votes of individuals, while unreasonably failing to read 
those made by others. The Florida Supreme Court determined to issue the recount, 
because they found it reasonable to interpret State law in such a manner as allowed 
under law, giving what seemed to be specific doubt as to how the Supreme Court would 
then later reason that such a determination would be unconstitutional. There was no 
clear issue that the State of Florida did not follow proper procedure in determining its 
electors when it was the State’s Supreme Court who determined the inconsistencies 
within its own State law. 
The dangerous result of this case is the precedent that the Court sets in its 
decision. Even though the Court, in its’ per curiam opinion, seemed to state that Bush v. 
Gore should never be followed as precedent, the actions taken by the Court show 
otherwise. (Ibid., 109). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurring opinion that 
“[t]hough we generally defer to state courts on the interpretation of state law . . . there 
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are of course areas in which the Constitution requires this Court to undertake an 
independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law.” (Ibid., Rehnquist, concurring 114). 
This statement leaves a very ambiguous determination to the Court in determining State 
law even when the Constitution specifically grants the States the power to determine 
the election process. The Constitution does not grant the Court the power to undertake 
such an independent determination of State law. If this remained the case after Bush v. 
Gore, the Court may now, at its own discretion, determine when and when not it should 
interfere with the plenary powers of the States, by simply disagreeing with the 
Constitutionally valid methods the State has taken. This type of discretion is not to be 
granted to the Court. The Court, as stated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison, should only be limited to pure legal questions that do not involve the 
implementation of discretion in making policy determinations upon the government. 
(Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803).). Precedent has stated that the Court may 
not interfere with the plenary powers of the States unless there is an expressed 
violation of the Constitution. (Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Ginsburg, dissenting, 
136).). However, the Court now has set the dangerous precedent that it may, based on 
its own accord, step in and interfere with any electoral determination, even if such a 
decision is Constitutionally sound. 
B. Shelby County v. Holder 
Second in line of the Court’s modern jurisprudence is the 2013 decision of Shelby 
County v. Holder. In 1965, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (hereinafter “the Act”) 
with the purpose of ending the historical discrimination of minorities in the voting 
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process. (Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. __, 3 (2013).). The Court determined the Act, 
specifically section 5, requires certain United States districts to gain federal pre-
clearance, by federal officials, before the district may make any changes to its laws or 
procedures involving the election process. (Ibid., 4). The Court then stated that such 
pre-clearance requires the district to show the “change had neither ‘the purpose [nor] 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.’” (Ibid.). 
The Court also stated that section 4(b) of the Act defined those covered districts as 
those “States or political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device as a 
prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter 
registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election.” (Ibid., 3).  
 In 2010, Shelby County, located in Alabama, brought suit in District Court against 
the United States Attorney General, seeking a declaratory judgment and permanent 
injunction that both sections 5 and 4(b) of the Act were unconstitutional. (Ibid., 7). After 
moving through the District Court and United States Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit, 
both Courts siding with the Attorney General, the case reached the United States 
Supreme Court in late 2012. (Ibid., 7-8). In an opinion delivered for the Court by Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court held section 5 of the Act to be unconstitutional 
because the current conditions within the designated districts show the constraints 
placed upon the designated districts are no longer permitted constitutional violations 
over the traditional local power to regulate such elections. (Ibid., 12-14). The conditions 
that were once present over the last few decades are no longer prevalent, and therefore 
do not permit such interference into the realm of regulating elections. (Ibid., 13-20).  
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 Within his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts relied heavily on the use 
of the constitutional principle of equal sovereignty amongst the States to strike down 
section 5 of the Act. (Ibid., 9-10). The purpose of the analysis given by Chief Justice 
Roberts, as given in Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 577 U.S. 
193, 203 (2009), was to determine whether “‘the Act imposes current burdens and must 
be justified by current needs.’” (Ibid., 9). Therefore, the Court first set out to determine 
whether the circumstances surrounding the Act were still necessary for the restrictions 
upon the States to be justified.  
 Chief Justice Roberts quickly deliberated and decided that the Act and its 
restrictions were no longer necessary for the circumstances that arose out of modern 
voting restrictions by noting that over the course of the last 50 years, these given 
circumstances had “changed dramatically.” (Ibid., 13). Additionally, modern changes to 
voting laws have shown no blatant attempt to discriminate against minorities in an 
attempt to evade federal laws. (Ibid., 14). Based on this lack of modern occurrences 
involving discrimination, and a large drop in the percentage of challenged laws under 
the Act, the Court held the States should not be bound by coverage created off the 
circumstances of years past. (Ibid., 23-24). 
In addition to the analysis over whether the Act was justified based on the given 
circumstances, the Court relied heavily on the idea of equal sovereignty amongst the 
States in striking down section 5. Chief Justice Roberts cited Bond v. United States, 564 
U.S. _, _ (2011) (slip op., at 9) in stating that “[t]his ‘allocation of powers [by the Tenth 
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Amendment] in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual 
sovereignty of the States.’” (Ibid., 9-10). Therefore, “[n]ot only do States retain 
sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty’ among the States.” (Ibid., 10). In determining the validity of section 5, Chief 
Justice Roberts determined that the Act “sharply departs” from the basic principle of 
equal sovereignty by only applying to 9 States and only several other counties 
throughout the country. (Ibid., 11). The Court reasoned that the Act intruded 
substantially into the realm of federalism and was a large departure from the familiar 
relationship between the federal government and the States. (Ibid., 12, citing Lopez v. 
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) and Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 
U.S. 491, 500-01 (1992).).  States have historically been granted wide control over the 
process and execution of federal elections even though the federal government 
establishes the time and manner of such elections. (Ibid., 10). However, not allowing 
some States to immediately enact what they deem to be a proper process because of 
the delays in federal approval under the Act, while other States may immediately enact 
the same exact process without the interference by the federal government; established 
unequal treatment amongst the States, violating the constitutional and “‘fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty’ amongst the States.” (Ibid., citing United States v. 
Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960).). It was this particular constitutional principle that was 
used to usurp Congressional power in the same manner that the right of contract was 
used in Lochner v. New York. 
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Chief Justice Roberts points out that the dissenting opinions refused to cite this 
constitutional “principle of equal sovereignty.” (Ibid., 23). However, Chief Justice 
Roberts, in giving the opinion of the Court, failed to consider the historical precedent of 
the Court giving wide discretion to Congress when enacting legislation over the power 
of the States which was specifically brought up in the dissent given by Justice Ruth 
Ginsburg:  
So when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote free from racial 
discrimination, we ask not whether Congress has chosen the means most 
wise, but whether Congress has rationally selected means appropriate to 
a legitimate end. ‘It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of 
[the need for its chosen remedy]. It is enough that we be able to perceive 
a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.’ 
(Ibid., Ginsburg, dissenting 10). 
This concept of giving Congress wide discretion when enacting legislation over 
the States has had a long precedent in the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, to 
which Chief Justice Roberts makes not such mention of in any part of his opinion for the 
Court. Instead, he seemingly used the principle of equal sovereignty to disregard and 
usurp the legislative power of Congress to rationally be able to act over the States. 
The power of Congress over the States dates back to the origins of the Court 
itself. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall determined that Congress need 
not be restricted to specific enumerated powers within the text of the constitution 
itself. (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4 Wheat. 316, 406 (1819).). Furthermore, Chief 
Justice Marshall reasoned that Congress as the national legislature must be granted 
discretion in applying the means it deems necessary to carry into execution the powers 
conferred to it. (Ibid., 421). In Shelby County, Congress should have been given similar 
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discretion. Congress had been given the power to implement any legislation deemed 
appropriate by the Enforcement Clause of the 15th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Therefore, based on the historical implications of McCulloch, the Court 
should have similarly granted Congress wider discretion. 
Furthermore, in a variety of contexts, the Court has consistently given Congress 
rational basis in enacting legislation over the power of the States. In Ex Parte Virginia, a 
case revolving around a Judge being indicted for selecting jurors based on race, the 
Court determined that the Civil War Amendments were “intended to be what they 
really are –  limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the power of 
Congress.” (Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 340; 345 (1879).). The Court further 
reasoned that any legislation contemplated by Congress “to make the amendments fully 
effective” and adapted to carry out the enforcement of the amendments “whatever 
tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain” is therefore brought 
within the powers conferred upon Congress. (Ibid., 345-46). “It is these which Congress 
is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, however put forth, 
whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.” (Ibid., 346). Instead, Chief 
Justice Roberts only brings up the history of the Civil War Amendments as intended to 
not punish for past acts but instead to help promote a brighter future. (Shelby County v. 
Holder, 570 U.S. __, 20 (2013).). Based off of this reasoning, the Court should have not 
applied the principle of equal sovereignty as strictly as it did, due to the Civil War 
Amendments were established as limitations upon the power of the States, especially 
when they have historically acted against the spirit of the constitution. Instead, the 
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Court should have applied the Act as a legitimate action conferred upon Congress over 
the States based on the true purpose of the 15th Amendment. 
Additionally, in the consolidated cases of James Everard’s Breweries v. Day and 
Edward & John Burke v. Blair, the Court determined that Congressional power, even 
though granted as concurrent with the States by the 18th Amendment, was not to be 
“impaired by reason of any power reserved to the States.” (James Everdard’s Breweries 
v. Day; Edward & John Burke v. Blair, 265 U.S. 545, 558 (1924).). Even though the 18th 
Amendment is no longer a part of the constitution, its’ wording is similar to the Civil War 
Amendments and its’ enforcement is similar to other sections of the constitution. The 
Court reasoned that when Congress and States have been given concurrent powers over 
any particular area, concurrent does not mean joint or that the enactments of Congress 
need to be approved or sanctioned by the States for legitimacy. (Ibid.). Since there was 
no such requirement, “if the act is within the power confided to Congress, the Tenth 
Amendment, by its very terms, has no application, since it only reserves to the States 
‘powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.’” (Ibid.). 
Based on this reasoning, the Voting Rights Act was improperly struck down with 
the Court taking legislative powers away from Congress by using the broad language of 
the 10th Amendment. Chief Justice Roberts extensively talks about how the States have 
been given the power to regulate elections under the constitution, especially under the 
10th Amendment. (Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. __, 10 (2013).). Specifically “‘[e]ach 
State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in 
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which they shall be chosen’ . . . Drawing lines for congressional districts is likewise 
‘primarily the duty and responsibility of the State.’” (Ibid., citing Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. 
Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892) and Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. _, _ (2012) (slip op., at 3).). 
However, the quote just used by Chief Justice Roberts says it is primarily the duty of the 
States, which is not in absolute terms. (Ibid.). Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts admits 
the federal government keeps to itself “significant control over federal elections.” 
(Ibid.). One specific example is Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution granting the power to Congress in determining the time and manner of 
electing Senators and Representatives. Based on the legal definition of “concurrent” 
given by Black’s Law Dictionary: Third Pocket Edition, “[h]aving authority on the same 
matters,” it seems that Congress and the States maintain concurrent powers over 
federal elections based on the explanation given by Chief Justice Roberts. (Black’s Law, 
s.v. “concurrent”). Therefore, based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in James 
Everard’s Breweries, the State powers and rights granted under the 10th Amendment, 
such as equal sovereignty and primary control over federal elections as prescribed by 
Chief Justice Roberts, should take a back seat to those powers conferred upon Congress, 
such as those created under the Act. 
Additionally, the Court in James Everard’s Breweries reasoned that when 
Congress does in fact enact legislation under its granted powers, the Court “may not 
inquire into the degree of their necessity” as implicated in McCulloch v. Maryland. 
(James Everdard’s Breweries v. Day; Edward & John Burke v. Blair, 265 U.S. 545, 559 
(1924).). Congress “may adopt any eligible and appropriate means to make that 
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prohibition effective.” (Ibid., 560). The controlling question therefore should only be 
whether Congress has exceeded any other constitutional limitations that were put upon 
“its legislative discretion.” (Ibid. 559-60).  
In enacting this legislation Congress has affirmed its validity. The 
determination must be given great weight; this Court by an unbroken line 
of decisions having ‘steadily adhered to the rule that every possible 
presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of Congress until 
overcome beyond rational doubt.’ (Ibid., 560). 
This method of review by the Court over Congressional legislation enacted over 
the power of the States was further established in a case often cited in Shelby County; 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach. In the Court’s opinion over whether to uphold the Act 
after a previous constitutional challenge in 1966, it was consistently reasoned that any 
legislation is appropriate when it was meant to “carry out the objects the [Civil War] 
amendments have in view” and whatever enforcement is necessary to help protect the 
equalities of civil rights and equal protection. (South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 307; 327 (1966).). Furthermore, the court held: 
We therefore reject South Carolina’s argument that Congress may 
appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in general terms – that the task of fashioning specific 
remedies or of applying them to particular localities must necessarily be 
left entirely to the courts. Congress is not circumscribed by any such 
artificial rules under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. In the oft-repeated 
words of Chief Justice Marshall, referring to another specific legislative 
authorization in the Constitution. ‘This power, like all others vested in 
Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the 
constitution.’ (Ibid.). 
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Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion often cites this precursor case, but fails to ever mention 
this historical deference given to Congress over legislative actions taken over the power 
of the States. 
It was based on this specific grant of power to Congress by the Enforcement 
Clause of the 15th Amendment that the Court overstepped its procedural bounds and 
instead took discretionary powers away from the legislative duties of Congress. When 
Congress has been granted the power to act, it is not for the Court to step in and restrict 
that power unless it has a reason to do so beyond any reasonable doubt. Throughout 
the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts continuously mentions that Congress has argued that 
the Act remains necessary for the deterrent of discriminatory voting violations. (Shelby 
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. __, 21 (2013).). However, Chief Justice Roberts uses his own 
analysis to determine the Act was no longer necessary, ignoring the rational basis only 
needed by Congress in order to maintain the enforcement of such legislation, instead 
placing a higher burden on Congress to trump the principle of equal sovereignty. (Ibid., 
9).  
In addition to making the Court’s argument, Chief Justice Roberts even admits 
that there are still problems within the given States; “[p]roblems remain in these States 
and others, but there is no denying that, due to the Voting Rights Act, our Nation has 
made great strides.” (Ibid., 16). In making such a statement, the Court has admitted the 
rational means necessary for Congress to maintain the legislation. Chief Justice Roberts 
consistently gives the Act credit for lowering the discrimination that was rampant in the 
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given districts throughout American history; “There is no doubt that these 
improvements are in large part because of the Voting Rights Act. The Act has proved 
immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and integrating the voting 
process.” (Ibid., 15). As additional evidence, Chief Justice Roberts specifically mentions 
the dissenting opinion of a lower court judge that the correlations found from the given 
evidence showed he viewed it “the other way: ‘condemnation under §4(b) is a marker 
of higher black registration and turnout.’” (Ibid., 8). Furthermore, Congress’ own 
admission that significant progress had been made by the Act destroying “first 
generation” barriers of racism was cited by the Court as evidence of change. (Ibid., 14). 
However, in making all these proclamations and stating how important the Act has been 
to disintegrating racial barriers, the Court ignores the risk that all such progress made by 
the Act could be dissolved once the Act and its restrictions are removed. By giving the 
Act so much historical credit, the Court is admitting to its rational importance, and by 
not listing other larger circumstances that could have led to change other than that 
created by the Act, the Court is admitting the Act was the driving force in such change. 
Therefore, the Court gives itself the rational basis it has historically required for 
Congressional legislation over the States. The Court ignores the rational risk involved; 
that if the driving force behind such change is removed, any previous positive changes 
could be dissolved into the ways of old. 
Based on the theory advocated for in Chapter II, the Court has extensively 
overstepped its judicial bounds. It has been shown that Congress had express authority 
to act under the 15th Amendment Enforcement Clause when passing the Act. Therefore, 
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the Court must cite a Constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
enact judicial review. However, as was shown, that doubt still existed in the Court’s 
determination. First, the principle of Equal Sovereignty amongst the States that the 
Court relied upon is not an express grant under the 10th Amendment or Constitution, 
therefore giving reasonable doubt as to whether such a Constitutional provision should 
legitimately be applied. Because the Federal Government has historically been granted 
wider powers under the Constitution, outside of the 10th Amendment, doubt seems to 
remain that a right of Equal Sovereignty amongst the States should have existed within 
the Constitution in order to restrict the powers of the Federal Government. Second, 
even the Court itself admitted there are still problems remaining within given States 
that the Act was aimed at resolving, even though it has been shown it is not within the 
Court’s power to determine necessity. (Ibid., 16). If the current times still have situations 
that call for the applicability of the Act upon the States, then the times call for such 
mandated restrictions upon the States to be enforced. Therefore, this admittance by the 
Court itself showed any other reasonable person may disagree or see doubt upon the 
Court’s determination that the Act has not remained necessary in the perspective 
determined by Congress. Even if people agreed upon the idea of an Equal Sovereignty 
amongst the States, doubt still exists as to whether the Act has become unnecessary as 
the Court had determined. Because the Court had reasoned that there is no 
Constitutional violation when the times call for such restrictions, there remains doubt 
that the Court had fully considered the necessity of the Act when determining that it is 
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now unconstitutional. The Court therefore failed to cite a clear Constitutional violation 
beyond any reasonable doubt in order to make this determination.  
Shelby County is the perfect example of the Court interfering into an area in 
which it does not belong. It has been shown that Congress was specifically granted the 
power to act appropriately under the 15th Amendment and such a grant gives it plenary 
power to act as it sees fit. The Court needs far more evidence to justify interference 
than by simply disagreeing as to the degree of necessity for the Act. Simple 
disagreement as to necessity does not equal a constitutional violation beyond any 
reasonable doubt. The issue of restoring State sovereignty does not apply to this specific 
instance. The 15th Amendment gives an express grant of power to Congress enabling 
legislation, and there must therefore be clear Constitutional violations to override this 
power. The Court must rely on Congress under its express grant of power to use its 
discretion wisely enough. If it seemed the Act was reaching too far into State autonomy, 
the Attorney General is also there as a constitutional check upon Congress with the 
ability to refuse enforcement or allowing more lenient standards in allowing for 
procedural changes by the States. 
In the end, the decision rendered for the Court by Chief Justice Roberts has 
usurped the legislative power of Congress to determine what is appropriate under the 
15th Amendment. As was the case in Lochner, the Court becoming the final arbiter of 
what “liberty” meant under the due process clause, substantially limiting the 
permissible action Congress may have taken, the Court has done the same in becoming 
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the final determinate of what “appropriate” means under the 15th Amendment’s 
Enforcement Clause. Even if the Court was trying to promote State autonomy as 
opposed to restricting it in Lochner, the Court has overstepped its bounds with the 
express grant of power towards Congress under the 15th Amendment. The Court has 
simply ignored a long line of precedent that allowed Congress great latitude in enacting 
what itself deems appropriate, more specifically when enacting legislation that is aimed 
against the laws of the States. 
C. Citizens United/McCutcheon v. FEC 
Lastly, are the cases of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. These two cases and the arguments 
surrounding them, have been consolidated into a single sub-chapter because their 
subject matter revolves around the same legal and political issue, campaign finance 
reform and the power of Congress and the Federal Election Commission. 
First, the case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission began in 2002 
when the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was passed to amend the already existing 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, prohibiting any union or corporation from using 
funds out of its direct general treasury to make any independent expenditure that 
promotes the campaign for or against any specific candidate who at the time was 
running for office. (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. __, 3 
(2010).). The Court determined that this type of “electioneering communication” was 
“defined as ‘any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication’ that ‘refers to a clearly 
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identified candidate for Federal office’ and is made within 30 days of a primary election 
or 60 days of a general election.” (Ibid.). 
In 2008, Citizens United, a non-profit organization, distributed “Hillary,” a 
documentary that was very negative towards Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, who 
was at the time a candidate for President. (Ibid., 2). Citizens United immediately sought 
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief due to the possibility of the documentary 
and its advertising being released within the statutorily prohibited 30 days prior to the 
then upcoming primary election. (Ibid., 4). The case primarily sought to find the 
restriction upon unions and corporations as unconstitutional. (Ibid.). The case began as 
an as-applied challenge to the statute, but the Court decided to determine the overall 
impact the federal statute had on similar speech throughout the country. (Ibid.). 
In overruling the previous case of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
which had upheld the provisions against a similar facial challenge, the Court held the 
limitation upon the donations as an “outright ban” on speech in violation of the First 
Amendment. (Ibid., 20). The idea of a PAC as a separate body from the actual 
corporation had been previously determined and therefore this restriction upon such 
donations is a strict ban on corporate expenditures and speech. (Ibid., 21-22). According 
to the Court, this restriction upon certain types of speech did not pass strict scrutiny. 
(Ibid., 23-24). This extension of free speech, the Court determined, had arisen under 
previous decisions that had extended the protections of the First Amendment to 
corporations and their political speech. (Ibid., 20-24). Overall, the Court determined that 
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corporate speech remains just as important as speech rendered by an individual. (Ibid., 
50).  
In Citizens United, the Court began its opinion by specifically stating itself, as a 
body of government, must not redraw the lines of the Constitution even with changing 
technologies; “Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment. We must decline to 
draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology 
used to disseminate political speech from a particular speaker.” (Ibid., 9). However, the 
Court itself takes Constitutional interpretation away from the legislature and instead 
gives itself the power of interpretation in a manner that began to restrict Congressional 
control or involvement in campaign financing. (Ibid., 11-12). It is the job of Congress to 
interpret public policy and act. However, in Citizen’s United, the Court refused to give 
any reasonable basis towards Congress’ own arguments or the idea that each case must 
be treated differently instead of the Court taking one large step in banning any type of 
Congressional regulation. (Ibid.).  
Additionally, the Court cites that during the 19th Century, the State and Federal 
governments “imposed a ban on corporate direct contributions to candidates.” (Ibid., 
26). However, when Congress determined it was necessary to act further under such 
historical precedent, the Court instead decided on its own to take down such history 
and grant First Amendment protections to corporations, extending the legal fiction that 
corporations are somehow human. (Ibid., 25-26). When confronted with such a strong 
precedent over implied powers, the Court, under the prescribed theory, must give 
rational reasoning towards Congressional determinations. Instead, in Citizens United, 
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the Court chooses to follow its own personally made precedent to follow and disregard 
the historical precedent created by Congress and State legislatures. 
Congressional positioning was formed around the idea that such restrictions 
were created to try and limit the overall influence those with large capital and money 
had over those who did not, and that donating money on behalf of an entire 
corporation from its own treasury failed to protect the interests of the shareholder and 
only promoted the interests of those in charge of the corporation and its funds. (Ibid., 
32). However, the Court determined to ignore this long line of reasoning and instead 
follow its own created precedent that permits and protects corporate speech. (Ibid.). 
The Court does argue that if such power is given to Congress, media outlets whom make 
money under the corporate form would be extensively restricted because this 
regulation would lead to Congress banning the “political speech of media corporations.” 
(Ibid., 35). However, this would not be an outright ban when it is limited to only a period 
immediately before elections. Furthermore, this is where the limit proposed by Thayer 
upon Congressional power would begin. The law already exempted media outlets from 
the ban, but if Congressional control began limiting free press, such an action would be 
an unreasonable violation beyond any reasonable doubt, that the free press was not 
meant to be targeted, but instead only the direct funding of campaigns. (Ibid.). The 
Court fails to make the distinction between donations made directly from corporate 
funds and those media corporations discussing and arguing policy on their individual 
networks or in their papers which was not banned. (Ibid., 37). 
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Instead, the Court somehow, as against the body of the people in Congress, 
determined that corporate political speech is the source of a vast amount of wealth that 
the people must have in order to make any political decisions; “The Government has 
‘muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy.’ 
And ‘the electorate [has been] deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to 
its function.’” (Ibid., 38 citing McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 
257-58 (2003).). Making such a determination is not the correct role of the Court. 
Congress is the body of public policy, determining whether corporate speech is the true 
source of such important information. The Congressional reasoning seemed to 
distinguish between corporations and media outlines by exempting them from the 
coverage of the Act. (Ibid., 35). Therefore, the Court must rely on the determination of 
Congress who has the power to delve into public issues with committees, and 
testimonies to determine whether corporate speech is as important as the Court 
determined from their own overview of the limited record before them. 
Based on the prescribed theory within Chapter II, this type of Congressional 
power falls under the implied powers standard. Therefore, Thayer’s exact principle of 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply and instead Congress must give an 
appropriate and legitimate reason behind enacting the law as was described by Chief 
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland. (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4 Wheat. 
316, 421 (1819).). However, as discussed, the Court seemingly disregarded the 
legitimate Congressional reasoning that was given within the case that they were 
protecting those who are not in control of large sums of capital. (Citizens United v. 
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Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. __, 32 (2010).). Furthermore, the Court used the 
principle of corporate speech as its reasoning in order to circumvent Congressional 
reasoning which is not an express grant under the Constitution. (Ibid., 32; 38). As long as 
Congress’ reasoning had not been completely arbitrary or out of leftfield, which had 
been shown not to be the case in that Congress gave a specific reason related directly to 
the subject matter of the law for passing the provisions, the Court should not have 
interfered into this specific instance of Congressional authority. 
Second, the case of McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission arose under the 
most recent challenge against the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. The Act 
gave a distinction between two differing types of bans towards campaign contributions. 
(McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. __, 3 (2014).). The first, a base 
line restriction, set upon donations a limit on how much any given person or contributor 
could donate to one given candidate in a specific campaign cycle. (Ibid.). The second was 
an aggregate limit which set an overall limit upon how much a contributor may donate 
to an overall number of candidates in a campaign cycle. (Ibid.). It was this second, 
aggregate limit  that came into question when McCutcheon, during the 2011-2012 
campaign cycle, was prevented from donating to 12 additional candidates due to 
reaching the aggregate limit allowed under the Act. (Ibid., 5-6). 
The Court determined that the main focus was “on an individual’s right to 
engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good.” (Ibid., 
syllabus 3). In striking down the aggregate limit provision, the Court determined that the 
limit did not serve the same purpose as the base limits in preventing quid pro quo 
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corruption or the appearance of such corruption. (Ibid., 19-22). This type of corruption 
being the only type the government may restrict speech in order to prevent. (Ibid., 2). 
Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in 
connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s 
official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the 
possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner 
‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties. (Ibid., 
syllabus 4). 
 
There is no express grant of power within the Constitution that specifically 
authorizes Congressional power over campaign financing. However, Congress has 
historically regulated the rules of federal elections along with the States. (Shelby County 
v. Holder, 570 U.S. __, 10 (2013).). Therefore, this type of power exercised by Congress 
falls into the implied powers of Congress and must be treated and respected as such by 
the Court. 
In McCutcheon, the issues and similarities with Lochner, are far more apparent 
than in Citizens United. Throughout its opinion, the Court acknowledges that Congress 
retains the Constitutional power to limit campaign financing only when preventing the 
occurrence or appearance of quid pro quo corruption. (McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission, 572 U.S. __, 2; 8 (2014).). The Court had again affirmed that the base limits 
under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act were permissible and reasonable methods 
towards restricting quid pro quo corruption. (Ibid., 3). Congress had stated that the 
aggregate limits were passed to prevent a circumvention of the base limits in order to 
prevent any specific individual from donating to an unlimited amount of PACs or 
organizations who in-turn would donate all those funds to the same candidate. (Ibid., 
syllabus 4). The Court in Buckley v. Valeo had a “fear that an individual might ‘contribute 
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massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through . . . unearmarked 
contributions’ to entities likely to support the candidate.” (Ibid., syllabus 4).  
However, the Court completely disregards this argument by Congress: “The 
Government’s scenarios offered in support of that possibility are either illegal under 
current campaign finance laws or implausible.” (Ibid., syllabus 4). This is where the Court 
has overstepped. The Court had previously allowed Congress wide power in setting base 
limits to prevent corruption. (Ibid., 3; 8). Therefore, Congress, under this implied power, 
should be able to do what it believes to be reasonably necessary to prevent further 
corruption or its appearance. This should include allowing the aggregate limit to prevent 
the circumvention of the base limits. Yet the Court took it upon itself to determine the 
reasonableness of the law. “As an initial matter, there is not the same risk of quid pro 
quo corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent actors to a 
candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly.” (Ibid., 22). The Court is 
not the body of government that has the ability to research and determine the actual 
risks involved in these types of decisions. This was a clear violation of the policy role of 
the Court, by refusing to give Congress reasonable power to act based on the research 
and determinations made by committees who are specifically tasked to research such 
issues. 
In addition to its denying of reasonable power to Congress, the Court took things 
one step further. In delivering the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts 
defined the type of corruption which Congress may act to prevent:  
Moreover, the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid 
pro quo corruption. Spending large sums of money in connection with 
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elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of 
an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo 
corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large 
sums may garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political 
parties. (Ibid., syllabus 4). 
 
This very narrow definition leaves very little room for Congressional action in the future. 
The only type of corruption left to fend off is the actual existence of corruption or 
exchange of money specifically meant for the services of the office holder. (Ibid.). This 
definition leaves out the entire purpose of preventing the appearance of such 
corruption and only limits action to the actual existence of corruption. Yet, Congress had 
previously been given the power to prevent the appearance of quid pro quo corruption 
which now seems to be abandoned by the Court for the express showing of corruption. 
(Ibid., Breyer, dissenting, 3-4). “In making this argument, the plurality relies heavily upon 
the narrow definition of ‘corruption’ that excludes efforts to obtain ‘influence over or 
access to elected officials or political parties.’” (Ibid., Breyer, dissenting, 3 citing Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. _, 389 (2010).).  
Furthermore, as was the case in limiting the definition of Due Process in Lochner 
v. New York, and limiting the definition of “reasonable” under the 15th Amendment to 
restrict Congressional action in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court has defined a term of 
corruption describing the power of Congress in such a manner that extensively limits the 
remedies and protections Congress may offer. Even though Congress does not have the 
express authority to regulate campaign financing, the Court must still grant wide 
discretion to act in this policy realm.  
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 Congress had determined that the aggregate limits were reasonable and 
legitimate in preventing the existence and appearance of quid pro quo corruption: 
In reality, as the history of campaign finance reform shows and as our 
earlier cases on the subject have recognized, the anticorruption interest 
that drives Congress to regulate campaign contributions is a far broader, 
more important interest than the plurality acknowledges. It is an interest 
in maintaining the integrity of our public governmental institutions. And 
it is an interest rooted in the Constitution and in the First Amendment 
itself. (Ibid., Breyer, dissenting, 4). 
 
This type of restriction remains reasonable as it is not an outright ban upon speech. If 
Congress determines this type of limitation is legitimate in its goal of preventing 
circumvention of the base limits, it should suffice for the Court. It does not become the 
role of the Court to instead ignore the reasons advocated for by Congress, and define 
corruption in such a manner that all but shuts out Congressional regulation of any 
possible appearance of corruption that is not as apparent as now required by the Court. 
 Overall, as was the case in Citizens United, this action by Congress falls under the 
implied powers of the theory described in Chapter II. Therefore, as long as Congress was 
able to give an appropriate and legitimate reason for passing the law, the Court should 
not have interfered. As was shown, the Court seemingly admitted and agreed with 
Congress that there was a reason for preventing the risk of corruption behind enacting 
the aggregate limits, but only disagreed as to its full necessity. (McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission, 572 U.S. _, 22 (2014).). By making this decision, the Court seems to 
admit the legitimacy of the Congressional action but because it disagreed as to the level 
of necessity, such reasoning was disregarded in violation of the overall theory to which 
the Court should comply. Furthermore, the Court, based on this disregard for 
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Congressional reasoning, took it upon itself to define the type of corruption that 
Congress had been historically able to prevent in such a manner that now limits future 
Congressional action only towards the actual exchange of money for political favor. 
(Ibid., Breyer, dissenting, 3 citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. _, 389 (2010).). Therefore, because the Court had seemingly agreed that there may 
be a level of legitimacy behind the aggregate limits but then disregarded such legitimacy 
based on an arbitrary level of necessity, the Court had overstepped its bound based on 
the prescribed theory of judicial review because it lacked the proper authority to make 
such a determination. 
 In both Citizens United and McCutcheon, the Court took it upon itself to set the 
limits of Congressional control over campaign finance. Within both instances, the Court 
took what was once held to be reasonable actions by Congress and instead redefined 
the parameters of Congressional control in a manner that all but eliminates action 
except in extreme circumstances.  
 Overall, these four cases show that the Court has returned to a more Lochner-
type jurisprudence in its Constitutional determinations over election law and campaign 
finance law. The Court has used Constitutional provisions in order to grant itself wider 
powers and discretion in making Constitutional determinations, while also limiting the 
powers of other governmental institutions. The cases of Bush v. Gore and Shelby County 
v. Holder showed how the Court failed to grant plenary powers of State governments 
and Congress in making sound decisions under their Constitutionally granted powers. 
While Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
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Commission showed the Court failing to give Congress the necessary discretion it should 
maintain under its implied powers under the Constitution. In all four cases, the actions 
taken by the Court have set a now dangerous precedent once seen during the now 
repudiated Lochner-era. By giving itself the final power to define specific terms within 
Constitutional grants of power, the Court has set itself up as the final arbiter of each 
area of public policy shown in the four cases, including election law, voting rights, and 
campaign financing. Even though the Court in Shelby County only created a sunset 
provision, the Court has given itself the power to define reasonableness and can now 
further restrict the definition as it sees fit. (Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. __, 24 
(2013).). This type of action has now limited the powers of the State and Federal 
government to initiate any further policy determinations in reforming these areas. It is 
now the Court’s discretion on whether or not policy reformation may take place, the 
one body of government to which policy discretion should not be allowed. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
Presidents come and go, but the Supreme Court goes on forever. 
- William Howard Taft 
(BrainyQuote 2001) 
 
 
This paper has continued the debate over the role of the Supreme Court by 
showing that the modern Court has returned to a Lochner-era type jurisprudence in the 
areas of election law and campaign finance. The Court must instead restrict its actions in 
order to leave public policy determinations for Congress. In so doing, this paper has 
argued that the proper role of the Court should be one of reviewing and determining 
Constitutional violations that only appear beyond a reasonable doubt. Contemporary 
cases in election law and campaign finance have shown that the Court has failed to 
make such determinations and instead has used Constitutional principles to appropriate 
powers for the Court away from the legislature and executive in these specific arenas; as 
the Court had previously done in Lochner v. New York. 
Chapter 2 set out to describe and summarize the theoretical debate over the 
role of the Court, from extremely active to quite limited. However, the position taken by 
James Bradley Thayer was argued as most compelling because the Court must prove a 
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt before taking action. Next, Chapter 3 
summarized how the Court itself, throughout history, has debated and acted in a 
manner where it too does not know how far itself can reach.  Lastly, in Chapter 4, the 
modern cases of Bush v. Gore; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission; Shelby 
County v. Holder; and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission were used to show 
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how the Court itself has returned to a jurisprudence closely resembling that of Lochner 
v. New York in the areas of election law and campaign financing. Furthermore, these 
cases are perfect examples of how the Court has failed to take action based on those 
principles exemplified by Thayer. 
In the end, the role of the Court in the American political structure will always be 
an issue of great importance. This paper has shown that the role of the Court has been 
at issue since the dawn of the country and gives no signs of ever dying out. The Court 
has become a body of politics and gives no signs of changing. This politicalization of the 
Court is best exemplified in the case of Harriet Miers. Miers, in 2005, was nominated by 
President George W. Bush to become a Justice of the Supreme Court after the 
retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. (Fletcher and Babington 2005). However, 
Miers’ nomination was struck down by members of her own party, Republicans, who 
thought her “conservative credentials” did not meet the required standard for 
upholding cases in the manner of those such as Bush v. Gore. (Ibid.). Therefore, 
President Bush withdrew the nomination and appointed the conservative federal 
appellate judge, Samuel A. Alito, Jr. (Ibid.).   
However, this paper has only been limited to showing politicalization of the 
Court in the areas of election law and campaign finance, and no further. Because this 
paper has been limited to only two sub-sections of the large area of Constitutional Law 
and the role of the Court, further research must be done to determine whether such 
politicalization has occurred, or is about to occur, in other arenas of Constitutional Law. 
Because there seems to be no real end to the politicalization of the Court, it must 
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remain an area of contention that this type of jurisprudence shown above could 
continue into other realms of public policy outside of election law and campaign 
finance. However, only time will tell as to how far the Court will reach. Whether, the 
current Justices maintain their jurisprudence or whether their replacement with newer 
Justices will change how far the Court will reach and make a retreat to the way things 
were before and after the Lochner-era remains to be seen. 
Overall, the law is determined by society and its specific needs, it is not for the 
Court to determine what law it believes to fall within or outside of “immutable natural 
rights.” (Gray 1892, 24). It is Congress who can rely on expert opinions and interpret 
national conditions, and who therefore should be able to make these larger 
interpretations over public policy, not the Court who is “limited to legal briefing and oral 
argument.” (Pound 1908, 3833; Pound 1909, 464). The Court must naturally give 
Congress far more deference in their legal determinations. (Bernstein 2011, 42). 
Hopefully this new modern era of the Court will not last 40 years as was the case for the 
Lochner-Era. Otherwise, there is no telling how far this Court will overstep into the 
political arena. 
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